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potential liars: effects of existential
threat on veracity judgments and the
moderating role of honesty norm
activation
Simon Schindler* and Marc-André Reinhard
Department of Psychology, University of Kassel, Kassel, Germany
With the present research, we investigated effects of existential threat on veracity
judgments. According to several meta-analyses, people judge potentially deceptive
messages of other people as true rather than as false (so-called truth bias). This
judgmental bias has been shown to depend on how people weigh the error of judging
a true message as a lie (error 1) and the error of judging a lie as a true message (error
2). The weight of these errors has been further shown to be affected by situational
variables. Given that research on terror management theory has found evidence that
mortality salience (MS) increases the sensitivity toward the compliance of cultural norms,
especially when they are of focal attention, we assumed that when the honesty norm is
activated, MS affects judgmental error weighing and, consequently, judgmental biases.
Specifically, activating the norm of honesty should decrease the weight of error 1 (the
error of judging a true message as a lie) and increase the weight of error 2 (the error
of judging a lie as a true message) when mortality is salient. In a first study, we found
initial evidence for this assumption. Furthermore, the change in error weighing should
reduce the truth bias, automatically resulting in better detection accuracy of actual lies
and worse accuracy of actual true statements. In two further studies, we manipulated
MS and honesty norm activation before participants judged several videos containing
actual truths or lies. Results revealed evidence for our prediction. Moreover, in Study 3,
the truth bias was increased after MS when group solidarity was previously emphasized.
Keywords: veracity judgments, judgmental bias, terror management theory, mortality salience, norm of honesty
Introduction
As a consequence of the 9/11 terror attacks, President George W. Bush proclaimed the “War
on Terror.” In addition to al-Qaeda, this military campaign was also targeted toward Saddam
Hussein and Iraq because they were assumed by the US government to possess weapons of
mass destruction. In their speeches, Secretary of State Colin Powell and President Bush assured
the existence of such weapons, leading most Americans to support the war against Iraq (Gallup
and Newport, 2004). However, investigations of a task force did not substantiate this argument
(Duelfer, 2004): no weapons ofmass destruction were found. Consequently, one third of Americans
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(Gallup and Newport, 2004) and some authors imputed
deliberate deception to President Bush (e.g., Corn, 2004).
Whether their accusation holds true or not, this incident clearly
illustrates the importance of investigating the eﬀects of existential
threats (e.g., 9/11 attacks) on veracity judgments. By referring to
ﬁndings on terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg et al.,
1986), we assume that existential threat aﬀects veracity judgments
on potentially deceptive messages depending on which social
norm (e.g., honesty) is momentarily salient.
According to TMT (Greenberg et al., 1986), cultural
worldviews function as an anxiety buﬀer against the ever-present
terror of potential death by providing a meaningful, orderly
conception of reality that contains a set of standards and values.
By living up to those cultural standards, people are enabled to
believe that they are valuable beings in a meaningful reality.
Based on this idea, the mortality salience (MS) hypothesis states
that reminding people of their mortality should lead to an
increased need for the protection provided by such worldview-
based beliefs: people want others to correspond to their own
cultural worldview, resulting in derogating those who violate
important cultural standards and supporting those who uphold
them (for an overview, see, e.g., Greenberg et al., 2008). In the
ﬁrst study of Rosenblatt et al. (1989), for example, judges had
to recommend a bond for a prostitute. Results indicated that
judges in the MS condition, on average, assigned a much higher
bond than judges in the control condition. Moreover, McGregor
et al. (1998) indicated that MS enhanced physical aggression
toward those who attack one’s political orientation whereby the
aggressor had administered to them an increased amount of hot
sauce. Thus, this line of research strongly supports the idea that
moral principles are part of the cultural anxiety buﬀer and that
transgressions of moral standards enhance devaluation of the
transgressors and even desires of punishing them.
However, because cultural standards can be contradictory
and result in a mixed pattern of behaviors (e.g., aggression vs.
helpfulness), Jonas et al. (2008) connected TMT with the focus
theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1991), stating that
norms have to be salient in attention or high in accessibility
to inﬂuence behavior (see also Higgins and Bargh, 1987).
This may be because people habitually follow a norm and/or
because certain conditions of the situation itself account for the
norm’s salience. In line with this reasoning, MS was found to
increase adherence to a broad range of activated norms, such
as paciﬁsm and conservatism (Jonas et al., 2008), egalitarianism
and helpfulness (Gailliot et al., 2008; Schindler et al., 2014),
proenvironmental norms (Fritsche et al., 2010), norms of justice
(Jonas et al., 2013; Schindler and Reinhard, 2015), and the
norm of reciprocity (Schindler et al., 2012, 2013; Schindler and
Reinhard, in press). In sum, TMT research clearly supports
the idea that MS increases sensitivity toward the compliance
of cultural norms, especially when they are of focal attention.
Notably, the inﬂuence of activated norms in these studies referred
to one’s own norm compliance, that is, MS was assumed to
increase the motivation to fulﬁll the norm by oneself. By contrast,
the current research focused on the perception and judgment of
other individuals who potentially engaged in behavior conﬂicting
with one’s worldview (i.e., deception).
Despite the large amount of TMT research on worldview
defense and norm adherence, to our knowledge, no empirical
investigations have been done on the norm of honesty. This
seems the more astonishing if one takes into account that surveys
have indicated honesty to be one of the most important norms
in people’s lives, in general (e.g., Geißler et al., 2013), and
speciﬁcally, for example, in romantic relationships (Weber and
Ruch, 2012) and politics (Bishin et al., 2006). Although literature
mentions honesty as an evolutionarily developed form of social
capital that can be accumulated (e.g., Somanathan and Rubin,
2004), for the current work, we refer to honesty as a norm;
namely, that one should tell the truth and should not lie.
Although lying has always been a social issue (Ekman, 1992),
people’s ability to discriminate accurately between lies and truths
is not particularly well-developed. In a comprehensive meta-
analysis of more than 200 studies, Bond and DePaulo (2006)
found that people without special training were slightly better
than the chance result of a coin toss (54%) when judging
the veracity of actual true or deceptive statements (for similar
results, see Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991; Aamodt and Custer,
2006; Hartwig and Bond, 2011). Besides discrimination accuracy,
Bond and DePaulo additionally found that people were better
at correctly identifying truths as non-deceptive (61%) than they
were at identifying lies as deceptive (47%; so-called veracity
eﬀect). Based on parallel ﬁndings of his meta-analysis, Vrij
(2000) asserted that analyzing accuracy at detecting actual lies
separately from detecting actual truths revealed “that people are
particularly poor at detecting lies” (Vrij, 2000, p. 240). This
result is due to people’s general tendency to judge messages
as true (so-called truth bias): Bond and DePaulo’s analysis of
percentage truth classiﬁcations revealed a mean of about 57%,
which diﬀered signiﬁcantly from 50%, supporting the truth bias.
Thus, when people are truth biased—that is, when they more
frequently judge messages as true rather than as false—logically
(or mathematically), they are likely to be better at correctly
judging actual truths compared to lies (e.g., Zuckerman et al.,
1979; Levine et al., 2010). For example, given that 10 statements
out of twenty are actually false, the accuracy for actual false
statements is 100% if all statements are judged as false. Given this
mathematical relationship, judgmental bias actually determines
the probability of detecting liars. Notably, overall-discrimination
accuracy was found to be unrelated to the truth bias (Bond and
DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig and Bond, 2011).
Literature attributes the truth bias to the phenomenon
whereby in daily communications, people usually believe
messages from other people without questioning honesty (e.g.,
Levine et al., 2010). Research has shown the truth bias to
be aﬀected by various factors: it is increased, for example,
in face-to-face interactions (Buller et al., 1991) or in close
relationships (McCornack and Parks, 1986). Moreover, truth bias
in close relationships has been shown to decrease when there are
contextual cues for suspicion (McCornack and Levine, 1990), that
is, when beliefs about communicative honesty are questioned.
Judgmental biases have also been shown to vary between diﬀerent
groups: the truth bias can, for example, be found for teachers (e.g.,
Reinhard et al., 2011a). By contrast, prisoners (e.g., Bond et al.,
2004, 2005) and police oﬃcers (e.g., Meissner and Kassin, 2002;
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1312
Schindler and Reinhard Existential threat and veracity judgments
Masip et al., 2005) showed a lie bias, that is, the tendency to judge
messages as false.
By applying signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966),
these diﬀerences in judgmental bias have been discussed and
found to depend on how people weigh the error of judging a
true message as a lie (false alarm) and the error of judging a
lie as a true message (miss). For example, it seems much worse
for a police oﬃcer to believe a liar than to suspect somebody
who tells the truth. By contrast, in daily conversations, falsely
blaming a friend of telling a lie might lead to an end of the
friendship. Thus, judgmental biases can plausibly be explained by
unequal importance to the two types of error (see also Hurst and
Oswald, 2012). Based on the idea that possible costs of making a
judgmental error vary as a function of situational variables, Hurst
and Oswald (2012) experimentally manipulated error weighting.
Results provided initial evidence for the idea that an increased
salience of the consequences of a false alarm (vs. a miss) results in
a truth bias.
Traditionally, research on veracity judgments has rather
neglected the underlying motivational processes of judgmental
biases (Levine et al., 1999, 2010; Levine and McCornack, 2001;
Masip et al., 2009). However, taking into account that people’s
judgmental biases actually determine the probability of detecting
actual liars, motivational aspects in error weighing seem to play a
crucial role.
In the current research, we address the eﬀect of existential
threat on judgmental bias depending on norm activation. In
general, people tend to judge messages of others as true. Even in
laboratory settings—where suspicion is increased by mentioning
the potential occurrence of deceptive statements—a truth bias is
likely to be found (e.g., Bond and DePaulo, 2006). According to
signal detection theory, the truth bias is based on the normally
high aversion toward the error of judging an actual message as
a lie (false alarm = error 1). Reducing the weight of this type of
error should therefore lead to a reduced truth bias (Hurst and
Oswald, 2012). Additionally, increasing the motivation to avoid
the error of judging an actual lie as true (miss = error 2) should
also lead to a reduced truth bias, even possibly resulting in a lie
bias (e.g., in the case of police oﬃcers). We now propose that
error weighing is aﬀected by MS and honesty norm activation.
MS was previously shown to increase people’s motivation to
devaluate and to even punishmoral transgressors (e.g., McGregor
et al., 1998). Moreover, research evidenced MS to increase the
motivation to fulﬁll cultural norms, especially when they had
been activated (e.g., Jonas et al., 2008). Regarding one’s own
norm compliance, it is plausible to assume that MS increases
honest behavior, especially when the norm of honesty has been
activated. However, instead of investigating one’s own norm
compliance, the current research focuses on the perception of
potential worldview transgressors, speciﬁcally the perception of
persons who potentially engaged in deceptive behavior. It is
important to recognize that this situation already implies some
violation of the norm of honesty. Therefore, an increased level
of suspicion can be assumed (McCornack and Levine, 1990).
Activating the honesty norm in a situation where dishonesty
is present should increase a defensive reaction, especially after
MS because MS increases sensitivity toward norm violations
(Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Consequently, the aversion toward error
1 (false alarm) should be reduced. We tested this assumption
in a pilot study (Study 1). Based on this assumed shift in error
weighing, we hypothesized that when activating the honesty
norm, people show a reduced truth bias when being reminded
of their own death (vs. control group). Given that the number
of judged messages as true (or false) is mathematically linked
to accuracy of actual true or false statements (e.g., Levine
et al., 2010), respectively, we expected a reduced truth bias to
result in better detection accuracy of actual lies and in worse
detection accuracy of actual true messages. In Studies 2 and 3,
we manipulated MS and honesty norm activation (by explicitly
emphasizing its social importance) before participants watched
and judged several diﬀerent sets of videos containing actual
true or false messages. In Study 2 (online study), we used a
no-activation control condition, whereas in Study 3, a group
solidarity activation condition was included. In this case, people
under MS should strive to enhance solidarity by avoiding error
1, that is, by avoiding convicting people of lying. Therefore,
we predicted an increased truth-bias under MS (vs. control
group), resulting in worse (better) detection accuracy of actual
deceptive (true) messages. We explicitly want to emphasize that
the predicted accuracy eﬀects are simply mathematically linked
to shifts in the truth bias and have nothing to do with any
ability eﬀects because they would refer to an overall improvement
in discriminating true statements from lies. Additionally, there
is substantial evidence showing that norm activation aﬀected
attitudes and behavior only when additional motivation (such as
MS) was induced (e.g., Jonas et al., 2008; Fritsche et al., 2010;
Schindler et al., 2013). We therefore did not expect an eﬀect
of norm activation on veracity judgments in our studies when
mortality is not salient.
Study 1
Before investigating the hypothesized eﬀects regarding the truth
bias, we wanted to check the underlying assumption that MS,
in combination with activating the norm of honesty, actually
decreases the weight of error 1; that is, that under those
circumstances, falsely blaming an innocent person of being
deceitful is perceived as less serious. Therefore, in this pilot study,
for those participants who read a short statement about the social
importance of the honesty norm, we expected a lower weight of
error 1 after MS (vs. control group).
Material and Methods
Subjects and Design
Ninety nine US citizens (53 women; Mage = 35.84, SD = 12.23)
participated in our Internet study via Amazon Mechanical Turk
(cf. Buhrmester et al., 2011). All participants were randomly
assigned to the experimental conditions in a 2 (MS vs. TV control
condition) × 2 (honesty vs. no-activation control condition).
Prior to participating, all subjects in this study (also in Studies
2 and 3) had given written informed consent in line with APA’s
Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct.
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Procedure and Measures
After the demographic measures, participants received the MS
or TV control treatment (see, e.g., Jonas et al., 2008): they
were asked to write down the ﬁrst sentence that came to
their mind when they thought about their own death (MS
condition) or about watching TV (control condition). When
using such explicit death primes, a distractor is necessary
to elicit eﬀects of worldview defense and bolstering (Arndt
et al., 2002). Therefore, as in many studies on TMT (Burke
et al., 2010), participants ﬁlled out the Expanded Form
of the Positive and Negative Aﬀect Schedule (PANAS-X;
Watson and Clark, 1992)1. Next, participants in the honesty
norm activation condition read a short statement about the
fundamental importance for society’s stability to follow the
norm of honesty. In the no-activation control condition, this
statement did not occur. Then, to maintain the cover story,
participants were instructed to watch several messages of
students describing movies they really liked or disliked, and
that some of these messages were in fact true because the
reporting students either liked or disliked the movie (for detailed
information, see Study 2). On the next page, participants then
read that before they would watch the videos, we would be
interested in their opinion on false accusations in general.
To measure the weight of error 1, they were asked to rate
the following statement on a seven-point scale (1 = “not
serious at all,” 7 = “very serious”): “In everyday life, how
serious do you regard mistaking a truthful statement for a
deceitful one generally?” After having answered this question,
participants were told that this had been a pre-test and that they
would not watch any videos. Finally, they were thanked and
debriefed.
Results and Discussion
The mean weight of error 1 was 4.79 (SD = 1.39). We conducted
a 2 (Salience: MS vs. TV control condition) × 2 (Norm
activation: honesty vs. no-activation control condition) analysis
of variance (ANOVA), with weight of error 1 as the dependent
variable. No main eﬀects occurred. However, as predicted, the
interaction between salience and norm activation was signiﬁcant,
F(1,95)= 3.95, p= 0.050, η2p = 0.04. The follow-up simple eﬀects
analyses within norm activation revealed that, in line with our
hypothesis, when honesty was activated, error 1 was perceived
as signiﬁcantly less serious in the MS condition (M = 4.23,
SD = 0.97) compared to the TV control condition (M = 5.15,
SD = 1.32), F(1,95) = 5.33, p = 0.023, d = 0.79. In the
no-activation control condition, no eﬀect of salience occurred,
F < 1, p = 0.642. Moreover, simple eﬀects analyses within
the salience condition revealed that participants perceived error
1 as marginally signiﬁcantly less serious after MS than did
participants in the no-activation control condition (M = 4.93,
SD= 1.34), F(1,95)= 3.14, p= 0.080, d= 0.58. In the TV control
condition, there was no signiﬁcant eﬀect of norm-activation,
p = 0.307.
1In this study, as well as in Study 2 and 3, data was checked for MS eﬀects on aﬀect
and, consistent with prior research on TMT, no signiﬁcant eﬀects were found, all
ps > 0.056.
In sum, this pilot study provides initial evidence for our idea
that MS aﬀects error weighing, depending on norm activation.
Speciﬁcally, we predicted and found that compared to all other
conditions, participants perceived error 1 as least serious when
the norm of honesty was pronounced and mortality was salient.
We interpret this result as a sign of reduced aversion toward false
alarms when judging potentially deceptive messages. This should
further be linked to a reduction in truth bias.
Study 2
In this online study, participants had to judge the veracity of
several videos in which other people talk about movies or series
they ostensibly like or dislike. For participants who read a short
statement about the socially important norm of honesty, we
assumed MS (vs. control group) to decrease aversion of false
alarms. This should result in judging the messages less frequently
as true, which should logically (i.e., mathematically) lead to
better detection accuracy when judging actual lies and to worse
detection accuracy when judging actual true statements. In the
no-activation control condition, we did not expect an eﬀect of
MS. If anything, based on the general ﬁnding that MS increases
the motivation to bolster one’s worldview (e.g., Greenberg et al.,
2008), one could speculate that MS increases the importance of
avoiding a false alarm, resulting in an increased truth bias.
Material and Methods
Subjects and Design
We calculated the sample size to obtain suﬃcient power to
detect both the two-way interaction on the judgmental bias and
the three-way interaction on detection accuracy (80% to detect
an eﬀect if one exists; Cohen, 1988). Power analysis assuming
an eﬀect of the predicted three-way interaction on detection
accuracy of f = 0.20 (cf. Reinhard and Schwarz, 2012), and
a small correlation between the dependent variables, revealed
an N of 120. Given the possibility of easily obtaining large
samples through Internet experiments (Reips, 2002), participants
in this Internet study included 156 German people (116 women;
Mage = 21.67, SD = 2.24). The design was a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed
model design with salience (MS vs. TV control condition) and
norm activation (honesty vs. no-activation control condition) as
between-participants variables, and type of message (lie vs. truth)
as the within-participants variable.
Procedure and Measures
Parallel to the pilot study, after the demographic measures,
participants received the MS or TV control treatment. Then,
participants ﬁlled out the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988). Next,
participants in the honesty norm activation condition read a
short statement about the fundamental importance for society’s
stability to follow the norm of honesty. In the no norm
activation control condition, this statement did not occur. Then,
participants were instructed to watch 24 messages of students
describing movies they really liked or disliked, and that some of
these messages were in fact true, as the reporting students did
like or dislike the movie (for detailed description of the stimulus
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material fabrication, see Reinhard and Schwarz, 2012, Study 2).
They were also told that some of these messages were not true
because the students described a movie they liked (disliked) as
though they disliked (liked) it. Participants were further told to
put themselves in the position of the person who interviewed
the students about their attitudes. Each participant was presented
with one of the three sets of 24 messages. Then they saw each of
the 24 messages, and immediately after watching each message,
participants had to classify it as a lie or as true. After having
judged all messages, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results
Truth Bias
We conducted a 2 (Salience: MS vs. TV control condition) × 2
(Norm activation: honesty vs. no-activation control condition)
ANOVA, with the number of messages judged true (in %) as
the dependent variable2. Overall, participants classiﬁed 53.39%
(SD = 10.19) of the messages as true. This value is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 50%, t(155) = 4.16, p < 0.001. Results of the
ANOVA revealed no main eﬀects, both Fs < 1. However, as
predicted, a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect of salience and norm
activation condition occurred, F(1,152) = 5.01, p = 0.027,
η2p = 0.033. As expected, when the importance of honesty
was pronounced, percentages of messages judged true were
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 50% in the MS condition
(M = 51.46%, SD = 9.69), t(39) = 0.95, p = 0.347, whereas a
truth bias occurred in the TV control condition (M = 54.90%,
SD= 9.62), t(39)= 3.22, p= 0.003 (see Figure 1). Although these
results are in line with our hypotheses, simple eﬀects analyses
revealed that percentages of messages judged true in the honesty
condition were not signiﬁcantly lower in the MS condition
compared to the TV control condition, F(1,152) = 2.31,
p = 0.131. However, we would like to note that the p-value is
based on a two-sided test. Thus, given our directional hypothesis,
the diﬀerence appears to be at least marginally signiﬁcant.
Additionally, and in line with our argument that activating the
norm of honesty should be responsible for this eﬀect, the truth
bias still occurred under MS in the no norm activation control
condition (M = 55.86%, SD = 9.34), t(31) = 3.55, p = 0.001.
Simple eﬀects analyses revealed that percentages of messages
judged true in the MS condition were marginally signiﬁcantly
lower in the honesty condition compared to the no norm
activation control condition again, F(1,152) = 3.36, p = 0.069.
When the norm of honesty was not activated, percentages of
messages judged true failed to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
2Additionally, we used signal detection analysis for hypothesis testing (e.g.,
Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999). Signal detection analysis generally yields two
parameter estimates: response bias c (criterion; i.e., a measure of true/false response
tendencies) and discrimination ability d′ (d prime; i.e., a measure of the ability
to detect truths/lies). Parallel to analyses of percentage of messages judged true,
analyses for Study 2, F(1,152) = 4.12, p = 0.044, as well for Study 3, F(1,77) = 4.65,
p = 0.034, revealed signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects on c. In both studies, no signiﬁcant
eﬀects occurred on d′.
3Note that the same F-value occurred when analyzing the three-way interaction
on detection accuracy. This is due to the perfect correlation between percentage of
messages judged true and the diﬀerential score of lie detection and truth detection
accuracy, leading to the assumption that in our case detection accuracy does not
depend on any detection ability (see Study 3).
FIGURE 1 | Means of messages judged true (in %) as a function of
norm activation and salience condition in Study 2.
50% in the TV control condition (M = 51.99 %, SD = 11.42),
t(43) = 1.156, p = 0.254. For this condition, simple eﬀects
analyses revealed that percentages of messages judged true were
however not signiﬁcantly lower in the MS condition compared
to the TV control condition, F(1,152) = 2.71, p = 0.102. Finally,
simple eﬀect analysis within the TV control condition revealed no
signiﬁcant eﬀect of norm activation, F(1,152) = 1.73, p = 0.190.
Detection Accuracy
We conducted a 2 (Salience: MS vs. TV control condition) × 2
(Norm activation: honesty vs. no-activation control condition)
× 2 (Type of message: lie vs. true) mixed-model design ANOVA,
with detection accuracy (in %) as the dependent variable. Salience
and norm activation were between-participants variables, and
type of message was a within-participants variable.
Overall, the mean percentage of correct lie-truth classiﬁcations
was 56.22% (SD = 11.53). On average, participants were
signiﬁcantly better than chance in their lie-truth classiﬁcations,
t(155) = 6.74, p < 0.001. Results of the mixed-model design
ANOVA revealed a main eﬀect of the type of message, indicating
that participants were better at classifying truthful messages
as actually true (M = 59.62%, SD = 13.82) than they were
at classifying deceptive messages as actual lies (M = 52.83%,
SD = 16.81), F(1,152) = 18.92, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.11 (veracity
eﬀect). Furthermore, the predicted three-way interaction between
salience and norm activation and type of message occurred,
F(1,152) = 5.01, p = 0.027, η2p = 0.03. Simple eﬀects analyses
for detection accuracy for actual lies within the honesty condition
revealed that participants under MS were better (M = 57.50%,
SD= 13.84) compared to the TV control condition (M = 49.38%,
SD = 19.92), F(1,152) = 6.44, p = 0.012 (see Figure 2).
Additionally, and in line with our argument that activating the
norm of honesty should be responsible for this eﬀect, simple
eﬀects within the MS condition showed that participants in
the honesty condition were also better at detecting actual lies
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FIGURE 2 | Means of detection accuracy of actual lies (in %) as a
function of norm activation and salience condition in Study 2.
(M = 57.50%) than participants in the no-activation control
condition (M = 49.22%), F(1,152) = 5.95, p = 0.016. Simple
eﬀects within the no-activation control condition indicated that
participants under MS (M = 49.22%, SD = 14.72) were not
signiﬁcantly worse compared to participants in the TV control
condition (M = 54.36%, SD= 16.91), F(1,152)= 2.39, p= 0.124.
Regarding detection accuracy for actual true messages, no eﬀects
occurred (accuracy ranged from 58.33 to 60.94%), all Fs< 1.
Mediation of Lie Detection Accuracy
The regression analyses supported the hypothesized mediation
(i.e., themathematical link) of percentage of messages judged true
on detection accuracy of actual lies. The interaction of Salience
(TV control condition = −1, MS condition = 1) × Norm
Activation (no-activation condition = −1, honesty
condition = 1) predicted percentage of messages judged
true in step one, b = −1.83, SE b = 0.82, t(152) = −2.24,
p = 0.027. In step two, the percentage of messages judged true
predicted participants’ detection accuracy, b = −12.24, SE
b = 0.93, t(151) = −13.19, p < 0.001. In step three, the total
eﬀect of the Salience × Norm activation interaction on detection
accuracy of actual lies, b = 3.32, SE b = 1.34, t(152) = 2.48,
p = 0.014, was reduced to non-signiﬁcance when accuracy was
regressed on the interaction and percentage of messages judged
true, b= 1.12, SE b= 0.93, t(151)= 1.21, p= 0.230. Additionally,
bootstrapping the proposed mediated moderation (using Model
8 of the Process macro of Hayes, 2013, and 5000 samples) also
revealed signiﬁcant results, that is, the 95% conﬁdence interval
did not include zero [0.74, 8.26].
Discussion
Results of this study support our interaction hypothesis that
when pronouncing the norm of honesty, existential threat
attenuates the truth bias when judging potentially deceptive
messages of others. Mediational analyses further indicated that
this eﬀect is mathematically linked to an increase of the accuracy
rate when judging actual lies. Thus, when people less (more)
frequently judged messages as true rather than as false, they
automatically improved (worsened) at correctly judging actual
deceptive statements. Somewhat unexpectedly, we found no
eﬀects on actually true messages (see General Discussion).
In this study, no truth bias occurred in the baseline condition
(i.e., no-activation in the TV control condition). This is
in contrast to what we would have expected. Consequently,
comparing the judgmental bias within the TV control condition
revealed that norm activation aﬀects truth bias by trend.
However, given that this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant, it should
not be overstated, especially, because it is theoretically hard to
explain. Furthermore, regarding the condition where no norm
was activated, MS, by trend, increased the truth bias. Besides the
given possibility of measurement error in the baseline condition,
one could also think of a theoretical explanation. According
to TMT, group membership and social identity plays a crucial
role when confronted with one’s own death (e.g., Greenberg
et al., 1990). Taking into account that people in the videos were
introduced as students, and that most of the participants in the
current study (about 78%) had reported being students too, it
could be that the increased truth bias after MS can be interpreted
as some kind of ingroup bias. That is, MS might increase people’s
motivation to believe that ingroup members do not lie to each
other. We will test this assumption in more detail in Study 3.
Study 3
To bolster the ﬁndings of Study 2, we designed a laboratory study
applying video material which contained true or false messages
of students who had been interviewed about having cheated on
a test. Parallel to Study 2, we assumed that participants who
read a statement about the importance of honesty should show
a decreased truth bias under MS (vs. control group), which
should consequently lead to better (worse) detection accuracy
when judging actual deceptive (true) messages. Additionally,
to investigate the eﬀect in the no-activation control condition
in Study 2, we included a solidarity activation condition.
As mentioned above, group membership and social identity
are highly relevant after MS: empirical evidence demonstrates
existential threat to enhance striving for togetherness and group
attachment (e.g., Mikulincer et al., 2003), in-group favoritism
(e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 1996; Jonas et al., 2002), and out-
group derogation (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; Fritsche et al.,
2008). We, therefore, assumed pronouncing the importance of
group solidarity under MS to increase motivation to avoid false
alarms, leading to increased truth bias, which should further




We calculated the sample size to obtain suﬃcient power to
detect both the two-way interaction on the judgmental bias
and the three-way interaction on detection accuracy. Power
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analysis, assuming a medium eﬀect of the predicted three-way
interaction of f = 0.25 (cf. Marksteiner, 2013) and a small
correlation between the dependent variables, revealed an N of
78. Participants in this study included 81 students (46 women)
recruited on the campus of a German university (Mage = 22.90,
SD = 2.45). The design was a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed model
design, with salience (MS vs. dental pain control condition) and
norm activation (honesty vs. solidarity condition) as between-
participants variables, and type of message (lie vs. truth) as a
within-participants variable.
Procedure and Measures
After the demographic measures, participants in the MS
condition answered two open-ended questions about death,
whereas participants in the control condition answered two
open-ended questions about dental pain (e.g., Rosenblatt et al.,
1989). Then, they ﬁlled out the PANAS. Next, participants
in the honesty condition read an alleged excerpt from the
university’s code of ethics in which the norm of honesty and the
responsibility of every student to uncover academic misbehavior
were pronounced. By contrast, in the solidarity activation
condition, the importance of cohesion and the responsibility
of every student to contribute to a companionate togetherness
without jealousy were pronounced. Afterward, participants were
instructed to watch eight messages of students being interviewed
about being accused of having cheated on a test, due to their
excellent performance. To produce this stimulus material, in the
cheating condition, students had been persuaded by a confederate
to use forbidden additives (e.g., calculator) after the attendant had
left the room to answer an alleged phone call. Participants were
told that all students pretended to have not been cheating and
that some of these messages were, in fact, true. Additionally, they
were informed that some of these messages were not true because
some of the students pretended to have not been cheating even
though they did cheat (for a similar procedure, see Exline et al.,
1970). Each participant was presented with one of three sets of
eight messages, and immediately after watching each message,
participants had to classify it as either a lie or truth. Finally,
participants were thanked, paid, and debriefed.
Results
Truth Bias
Overall, participants classiﬁed 59.9% (SD = 14.62) of the
messages as true. This value is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
50%, t(80) = 6.08, p < 0.001. Results of the 2 (Salience:
MS vs. dental pain control condition) × 2 (Norm activation:
honesty vs. solidarity condition) ANOVA on number of messages
judged true (in %) revealed no main eﬀects, both Fs < 1.
However, as predicted, a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect of salience
and activation condition occurred, F(1,77) = 4.87, p = 0.030,
η2p = 0.06. As expected, when the importance of honesty
was pronounced, percentages of messages judged true were
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 50% in the MS condition
(M = 55.00%, SD = 14.85), t(19) = 1.51, p = 0.148, whereas
the truth bias occurred in the dental pain control condition
(M = 62.50%, SD = 14.62), t(19) = 3.82, p = 0.001 (see
Figure 3). Although these results are in line with our hypotheses,
FIGURE 3 | Means of messages judged true (in %) as a function of
norm activation and salience condition in Study 3.
simple eﬀects analyses revealed that percentages of messages
judged true in the honesty condition were not signiﬁcantly
lower in the MS condition compared to the dental pain control
condition, F(1,77) = 2.71, p = 0.104. As in Study 2, we would
like to note that the p-value is based on a two-sided test.
Thus, given our directional hypothesis, the diﬀerence appears
to be at least marginally signiﬁcant. Furthermore, percentages
of messages judged true in the solidarity activation condition
were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 50% in the MS condition
(M = 64.38%, SD = 15.85), t(19) = 4.06, p < 0.001, as well as
in the dental pain control condition (M = 57.74%, SD = 12.17),
t(20) = 2.91, p = 0.009. Again, simple eﬀects analyses revealed
that percentages judged true in the solidarity activation condition
were not signiﬁcantly higher in the MS condition compared to
the dental pain control condition, F(1,77) = 2.17, p = 0.144.
Additionally, simple eﬀects analyses revealed that percentages
of messages judged true in the MS condition were lower in
the honesty condition compared to the solidarity activation
condition, F(1,77) = 4.23, p = 0.043, d = 0.61. No signiﬁcant
eﬀect of norm activation occurred within the dental pain control
condition, p = 0.294.
Detection Accuracy
Overall, the mean percentage of correct lie-truth classiﬁcations
was 50.62% (SD = 16.76). On average, participants were not
better than chance in their lie-truth classiﬁcations, t < 1. Results
of the mixed-model design 2 (Salience: MS vs. TV control
condition) × 2 (Norm activation: honesty vs. no-activation
control condition) × 2 (Type of message: lie vs. truth) ANOVA
on detection accuracy (in %) revealed a main eﬀect of the type
of message, indicating that participants were better at classifying
actual truthful messages as true (M = 60.49%, SD = 20.87)
than they were at classifying actual deceptive messages as lies
(M = 40.74%, SD = 23.53), F(1,77)= 38.25, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.33
(veracity eﬀect). Most importantly, however, the ANOVA yielded
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the predicted three-way interaction, F(1,77) = 4.87, p = 0.030,
η2p = 0.06. Simple eﬀects analyses for detection accuracy for
actual lies within the honesty condition revealed that participants
under MS were marginally signiﬁcantly better (M = 47.50%,
SD = 26.78) compared to the dental pain control condition
(M = 36.25%, SD = 23.61), F(1,77) = 3.05, p = 0.085 (see
Figure 4). Additionally, and in line with our argument that
activating diﬀerent norms should be responsible for this eﬀect,
simple eﬀects within the MS condition showed that participants
in the honesty condition were also signiﬁcantly better at
detecting actual lies (M = 47.50%) than were participants
in the solidarity condition (M = 33.75%), F(1,77) = 4.55,
p= 0.036. Simple eﬀects within the solidarity condition indicated
that participants under MS were marginally signiﬁcantly better
worse (M = 33.75%, SD = 18.63) than in the dental pain
control condition (M = 45.24%, SD = 23.21), F(1,77) = 3.26,
p = 0.075. Norm activation within the dental pain control
condition revealed no signiﬁcant eﬀect, p = 0.166. Regarding
detection accuracy for actual true messages, no eﬀects occurred
(accuracy ranged from 57.50 to 62.50%), all Fs< 1.
Mediation of Detection Accuracy
The regression analyses supported the hypothesized mediation
of percentage of messages judged true on detection accuracy
of actual lies. The interaction of Salience (dental pain control
condition = −1, MS condition = 1) × Norm activation
(solidarity = −1, honesty = 1) predicted the percentage of
messages judged true in step one, b = −3.53, SE b = 1.60,
t(77) = −2.21, p = 0.030. In step two, the percentage of
messages judged true predicted participants’ detection accuracy,
b = −16.23, SE b = 1.96, t(76) = −8.27, p< 0.001. In step three,
the total eﬀect of the Salience × Norm activation interaction
on detection accuracy of actual lies, b = 5.69, SE b = 2.58,
t(77) = 2.20, p = 0.031, was reduced to non-signiﬁcance when
accuracy was regressed on the interaction and the percentage
FIGURE 4 | Means of detection accuracy of actual lies (in %) as a
function of norm activation and salience condition in Study 3.
of messages judged true, b = 1.76, SE b = 1.95, t(76) = 0.91,
p = 0.368. Additionally, bootstrapping the proposed mediated
moderation (using Model 8 of the Process macro of Hayes, 2013,
and 5000 samples) also revealed signiﬁcant results, that is, the
95% conﬁdence interval did not include zero [0.99, 15.92].
Discussion
Results of this study show additional support for our hypothesis
that by activating the norm of honesty, MS decreases the truth
bias when judging potentially deceptive messages of others. By
contrast, when solidarity was pronounced, MS increased the truth
bias. Mediational analyses further indicated that these eﬀects
aﬀect the accuracy rate when judging actual lies: when people less
(more) frequently judged messages as true rather than as false,
they automatically improved (worsened) in correctly judging
actual deceptive statements. Unexpectedly, as in Study 2, no
eﬀects on actual true messages occurred. Additionally, and again
parallel to Study 2, comparing the judgmental bias within the
TV control condition reveals that norm-activation aﬀects truth
bias by trend. Compared to the honesty activation condition,
we would have expected that in the solidarity condition, the
truth bias is at least as equally strongly developed (without MS).
Although this trend was not expected, it should not be overstated
because the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
General Discussion
The current studies addressed the societally important issue
of existential threat on veracity judgments. By referring to
research on TMT (e.g., McGregor et al., 1998; Jonas et al.,
2008), which has indicated that MS increases the sensitivity
toward the compliance of cultural norms, especially when they
are in focal attention, in both studies, we predicted and found
evidence for the idea that when the importance of honesty is
explicitly pronounced, MS leads to a reduced truth bias what
(mathematically contingent) led to better detection accuracy
regarding actual lies. Additionally, in Study 3, explicitly activating
the importance of group solidarity increased the truth bias after
MS what again led to worse detection accuracy regarding actual
lies. This last prediction was based on the well-supported idea
that MS increases ingroup bias (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990).
By applying signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966),
we assumed motivational changes in judgmental error weighing
to be responsible for eﬀects on judgmental biases (Hurst and
Oswald, 2012). The truth bias is based on the normally high
aversion toward the error of judging an actual message as
a lie (error 1). Reducing the weight of this type of error
should therefore lead to a reduced truth bias. In Study 1, we
found evidence for this assumption, supporting the supposed
underlying process of error weighing. Given that MS has been
evidenced to increase people’s need for salient cultural norms
to be fulﬁlled, activating the honesty norm in a situation where
dishonesty is present should increase a defensive reaction after
MS (e.g., Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Based on this, when the norm of
honesty was activated, participants in theMS condition perceived
error 1 as less serious compared to the control condition.
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Although we did not asses perceptions of error 2, we would
predict that error 2 is perceived as more serious after honesty
activation and MS. By contrast, when it is highly important
to bolster group solidarity, avoiding error 1 becomes highly
important. The best strategy then is to refrain from accusing
people of lying. In line with this notion, in Study 3, solidarity
activation under MS increased the truth bias.
Although the ﬁndings ﬁt to our theoretical considerations,
we’d like to discuss an alternative hypothesis, which is how
MS might inﬂuence bias in judgments of veracity: one might
assume that honesty activation and MS increase the truth bias
instead of decreasing it, as we suggested and found. Given
that MS enhances the need of an anxiety-buﬀering shelter, one
could assume that when activating the norm of honesty, MS
strengthens the belief that the world is a trustworthy place, where
deception does not happen. Hence, most statements should be
judged as true. Evidence on MS induced reduction of dissonance
(Jonas et al., 2003) and increased self-serving bias (Mikulincer
and Florian, 2002; Rudert et al., 2015) could be interpreted as
support for this kind of positive illusion. Although seemingly
plausible, we claim that such a perspective, in general, has its
evolutionary limits and is therefore less valid. Rudert et al.
(2015), for example, found that people reduce their regrets after
being reminded of their own death. However, as the authors
stated themselves, motivational and also (negative) aﬀective
states evolutionarily developed to enable an adequate adaptive
reaction (Smith and Semin, 2004). That means, as feelings of
regret can be assumed to serve an evolutionary function (e.g.,
by inducing the motivation to learn from mistakes), ignoring
this state in the long run can be considered to be rather
detrimental. Thus, although MS might contribute to beliefs in
positive illusions in the short term, it is doubtful (and also not
evolutionarily functional) that human beings are unlimitedly
able to construct the world according to their motivation of
feeling safe and happy (cf. Berger and Luckmann, 1967). If this
is the case, then MS would less likely increase the motivation to
actually engage in worldview validation. For example, activating
pro-environmental norms would not lead to increased pro-
environmental behavior (as evidenced by Fritsche et al., 2010),
but rather would lead to the perception that the environment is
not suﬀering at all. Beyond this contradicting line of argument,
we further want to mention that we did not use a subtle priming
(cf. Jonas et al., 2008), but in contrast, explicitly emphasized
the norm’s societal importance. Additionally, we suggest that
the role of experimental scenario plays a crucial role in our
ﬁndings. Introducing participants to judge potentially deceptive
messages implies a violation of the norm of honesty and increases
suspicion. Thus, we activated honesty by highlighting its societal
importance in a situation where dishonesty was present. We
therefore predicted a defensive reaction of increasing skepticism
(i.e., reduced truth bias). However, it is not clear to what
extent the current ﬁndings depend on this speciﬁc situation.
Hence, the current ﬁndings should only be cautiously transferred
to everyday situation where no initial reason for suspicion is
given.
Looking at actual true messages, we predicted honesty
activation and MS to reduce accuracy mathematically due to
an increased truth bias (e.g., Levine et al., 2010). However—
despite the existent eﬀects in truth bias—in both studies, accuracy
on actual true messages remained unaﬀected by MS and norm
activation, indicating that variations in truth bias did not aﬀect
variations in detection accuracy of lies and truths to the same
degree. We speculate that this can be ascribed to the fact that
the percentage of messages judged true were only moderately
reduced and did not fall below the 50% level (i.e., there was no
lie bias; see also McCornack and Levine, 1990). Furthermore, it
should be mentioned that the truth bias found in experimental
settings (where people are forced to make a judgment) is likely
to be underestimated compared to interactions outside the lab
(Bond and DePaulo, 2006).
Whereas Studies 2 and 3 provided support for our interaction
hypothesis, in both studies, the honesty norm activation did
not reduce truth bias without MS. At ﬁrst glance, this seems
to be in contrast to traditional approaches (e.g., Cialdini et al.,
1991). However, our data aligns with many studies which
failed to ﬁnd eﬀects of simple norm activation, but which
did ﬁnd an eﬀect on people’s attitudes and behaviors only
when additional motivation (e.g., MS) came into play (e.g.,
Gailliot et al., 2008; Jonas et al., 2008; Fritsche et al., 2010;
Schindler et al., 2013). Taking a closer looking at the interaction
patterns further revealed that honesty activation withouth MS
by trend even results in an increased truth bias. Although
those diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant, they are contrary to our
expectations. In Study 2, the trend is probably due to the
missing truth bias in the baseline condition (i.e., no-activation
in the TV control condition). In Study 3, compared to the
honesty activation condition, we would have expected that in
the solidarity condition, the truth bias is at least as equally
strongly developed (without MS). Given those rather puzzling,
unexpected trends, the validity of our conclusions should be
considered with caution. Nevertheless, we think that the two
studies provide convincing evidence for our idea that the truth
bias is aﬀected by existential threat, depending on honesty norm
activation.
Although our ﬁndings indeed show existential threat to aﬀect
truth bias and detection accuracy of actual lies, we did not
ﬁnd any support for eﬀects on overall detection skills, as this
would imply higher accuracy rates for detecting lies and truths as
well. Research provided strong evidence that improved detection
skills especially relate to the use of verbal information, which
requires a certain degree of motivation and capacity (Reinhard,
2010; Reinhard et al., 2011b, 2013; Reinhard and Schwarz, 2012).
Based on this, there should be certain circumstances in which
MS might also lead to increased detection skills. Given that
TMT research evidencedMS to increase self-esteem striving (e.g.,
Pyszczynksi et al., 2004), one could assume that if accurately
detecting deception is linked to a boost in self-esteem (e.g.,
a judge who wants to fulﬁll the ideal of ﬁnding the truth),
MS should increase the motivation to accurately distinguish
between false and true statements, leading to higher detection
accuracy. Parallel to this reasoning, Schindler and Reinhard
(2015) recently found MS to increase deception accuracy for
people with a dispositional, strong belief in a just world. The
authors assumed such people to be highly concerned about
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matters of justice (such as accurately judging the veracity of
a message). Therefore, people with a strong belief in a just
world were assumed to be highly motivated to accurately detect
deception when there is reason to engage in just behavior (in
this case, MS). Given that MS appears to aﬀect overall detection
accuracy as well as judgmental biases, future research should
systematically investigate the boundary conditions for this mixed
pattern of results.
Returning to the political incident mentioned at the beginning
of the introduction, our ﬁndings appear especially interesting
in cases of existential threats, such as the events of 9/11,
as it seems likely that political leaders pronounce norms of
solidarity. According to our results, this might result in less
suspicion toward the sender’s messages, whereas pronouncing
the importance of being honest instead might lead to a higher
probability of increasing skepticism.
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